Israel-Iran 2025: Developments in Iran’s nuclear programme and military action
On 13 June 2025, Israel launched a series of attacks against Iran’s nuclear programme.

What has happened in Syria after the fall of Assad, who are the main actors, and how has the UK and others responded?
Syria after Assad: Consequences and interim authorities 2025 (3 MB , PDF)
In December 2024, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that President Bashar al-Assad, who had governed Syria since 2000, had resigned and offered asylum in Russia. Russian media say he is now in the country.
Since Assad’s resignation, an interim government has been declared in Syria, led by the leader of the former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, Ahmed al-Sharaa, which also published a new constitutional declaration in March 2025. HTS was one of the opposition groups, including the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), involved in the offensive against Assad forces which culminated in the capture of the capital, Damascus, in December 2024.
This research briefing describes the key actors in Syria; continuing violence and human rights concerns; the status of Syria’s chemical weapons; the significance of Assad’s fall to his allies Iran and Hezbollah and the attempts of Russia to retain its Syrian bases; Israeli actions in the Golan Heights; actions by the interim government; and the strength of Islamic State/Daesh. It also sets out UK, US and EU actions and statements, including on sanctions.
The Commons Library research briefing, Syrian civil war: timeline, UK aid and statistics, has a timeline of events in Syria from 2011 to 2025, and information on the humanitarian situation, UK aid, and further resources on the conflict.
Syria continues to have several armed groups, though the declared Syrian Government reports that most have now been unified under a single command. Those previously members of HTS constitute the dominant group, controlling most territory, the interim presidency and ministries such as defence and the interior.
While it has now dissolved, HTS remains a proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the UN, EU, UK and others. The United States removed its designation as a foreign terrorist organisation in July 2025.
Other groups are the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), backed by the United States. The SDF has been critical of the post-Assad government and constitutional declaration. While it agreed in March to become part of the new administration, talks on the timing and conditions remain. The SNA has agreed to integrate with the state armed forces. During the civil war, HTS, SNA and SDF were all accused of human rights violations.
Humanitarian need remains high, with an estimated 16.5 million people in need in 2025. Ongoing violence between the SDF and SNA in north east Syria in early 2025 led to the displacement of around 1.1 million people and civilian and combatant casualties. There has also been over a decade of extensive damage to Syrian infrastructure, including schools and hospitals. There are around 4.5 million Syrian refugees in the region, which neighbouring states are seeking the return of. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund have begun to re-engage with Syria in 2025, partly reflecting the lifting of sanctions by the United States and others (see below).
There have also been incidents of violence against minority groups in Syria, including Alawites (associated with the Assad government, he being an Alawite), Druze (which Israel has pledged to support) and Christians. The highest casualty numbers were reported in March, against Alawites in coastal areas of Syria. Between 1,000 and 1,500 people were killed, with groups associated with HTS among those blamed. The declared Syrian government is investigating. The UN Security Council issued a collective presidential statement “strongly condemning” the widespread violence against Alawites.
In December 2024 HTS, which controls the largest part of Syria and the capital, declared the establishment of a transitional government and in January the appointment of its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa as interim president.
The HTS-declared interim government issued an amnesty for those conscripted into Assad government forces, dissolved parliament (dominated by Assad’s Baathist party), said it wanted to disarm and dissolve all non-state armed groups, and that it would protect religious and other minorities.
The interim government was replaced by Sharaa in March, and a temporary constitution declared. HTS officials have the most powerful cabinet posts, but it does include one Alawite, Druze, Christian and Kurdish member (though not from the SDF). The SDF criticised the constitution as “entrenching central governance”. In response, Sharaa said he opposes greater decentralisation.
The constitution says there should be only a single armed force. Sharaa is to directly appoint one-third of the interim legislative assembly and committees to choose the remaining members. No elections are planned for four to five years, with Sharaa citing the lack of a census and number of refugees abroad.
The UK has welcomed the new government and its commitment to hold elections but wants greater protection for minorities and accountability for human rights abuses under the Assad regime.
HTS has its origins in Al-Qaeda although it says it broke from the group in 2016. Its leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani (whose real name is Ahmed al-Sharaa) participated in the insurgency against US and UK coalition forces in Iraq in the 2000s.
The UN Security Council, UK, US, EU, and others have all designated it a terrorist group. All said they will judge HTS by its actions, not words and they want it to protect civilians, minority groups and implement a peaceful transition. In December 2024 Prime Minister Keir Starmer said it was “too early” to reconsider the proscription of HTS as a terrorist organisation in the UK. However, in July 2025 the US removed the foreign terrorist designation from HTS, stating it had “commit[ed] to combat terrorism in all its forms”.
The UK, EU and US have also all progressively removed sanctions against Syria in 2025, though retaining those on military goods, chemical weapons, and individuals linked to the Assad government. The Syrian central bank and energy companies are among those who have had sanctions removed. This is expected to ease investment by Arab Gulf states in Syrian reconstruction.
The US has previously said the removal of sanctions was conditional on the new authorities making commitments to address terrorism and making progress on normalising ties with Israel.
In July 2025, the UK formally established diplomatic ties with a visit by the Foreign Secretary. European and American officials have also engaged.
While Assad has fallen, some conflict and military activity is ongoing. In addition to airstrikes against Islamic State/Daesh (see below), Israel and Turkey are two external actors continuing to be militarily active in Syria:
The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have moved from the occupied Golan Heights to occupy a UN buffer zone and also operate in southern Syria. The Heights are disputed between Israel and Syria. The UK and a 1981 UN Security Council resolution call for Israeli withdrawal from them. The US considers the Heights to be Israeli territory.
Israel said its actions in 2024 were a temporary move to pre-empt possible attacks and reflected the withdrawal of Assad government forces from the zone. In 2025, Israel said it would remain “indefinitely” at Mount Hermon to ensure security for Israel and the Golan and wants the demilitarisation of parts of southern Syria with no HTS presence. The IDF also carried out many strikes against chemical weapons and military facilities in Syria in 2024 and 2025, and also says it has acted to protect the Druze minority in the country. Israel has previously attacked Iranian and Hezbollah forces in Syria since 2013. It has also announced an expansion of settlements in the occupied Golan Heights.
Turkey continues to back the SNA, who launched operations against the SDF in November (Turkey has been launching such attacks since 2016). Turkey argues the SDF has links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), who have been waging an insurgency in Turkey and are considered a terrorist organisation by the EU and UK, among others. Turkey has said it expects the PKK to be disarmed. In March the PKK leader said the group should lay down its arms. The SDF say this does not apply to them.
HTS has also suggested SDF areas should “gain freedom” but differentiated between Kurdish groups and the PKK. The UK and US say the SDF’s role in combatting Islamic State should be protected and acknowledge Turkish concerns on the PKK.
Analysts judge Turkey, which backed the opposition, as the most likely beneficiary of Assad’s fall. Turkey had been in failed negotiations with Assad to normalise relations in 2023 and 2024, with the aim of returning Syrian refugees from Turkey. Turkey hosts around 2.9 million Syrian refugees. Turkey has offered to help train the armed forces of Syria if requested.
To Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah, the fall of Assad marks a strategic defeat for Iran’s “axis of resistance”. This is a network of armed and terrorist groups Iran has developed, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen, to threaten Israel and others. The loss of Assad cuts a significant land route from Iran to Lebanon. It follows the weakening of Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran as military forces in their conflicts with Israel.
Russia was also a significant backer of President Assad, and its military bases in Syria were thought to have allowed it to project power across the Mediterranean and the Middle East and North Africa. The HTS interim defence minister says HTS is open to Russia retaining some bases, if it benefits Syria. Russian withdrawal from some areas has been reported in the meantime.
The consequences for Israel are also uncertain. There was no direct conflict between Bashar al-Assad and Israel, but the two countries have never signed a peace agreement and fought significant conflicts from 1948 onwards. The Israeli government says it considers threats from Syria to have “intensified” and is reportedly seeking a Syria with a weak central government. However, the US also hopes Syria and Israel may establish diplomatic relations. The status of the Golan Heights is one challenge to this recognition, but some analysts judge that a security agreement may be achievable.
Islamic State lost its last territory in Syria in 2019. However, the US warned the group has claimed double the number of attacks in Syria in 2024 as in 2023 and may seek to take advantage of Assad’s fall.
The US has 2,000 troops in Syria, most of which are based in the north east alongside the SDF. The Trump administration says it will half their number. The SDF holds several thousand Islamic State fighters in detention, as well as hosting camps of around 40,000 family and other members. The US has been seeking their repatriation, citing risks of radicalisation in camps and increased Islamic State activity
19 December 2024: Added information on UK, US and EU engagement with HTS, Israeli actions in the Golan Heights, and positions of HTS and SDF.
27 February 2025: Added information on HTS-declared interim government, Israeli actions, UK and EU plans on sanctions
13 March 2025: Added information on March 2025 violence in Alawite areas, UK sanctions and the agreement between the SDF and interim authorities.
11 July 2025: Added information on violence against Alawites, Christians and Druze, the lifting of UK, EU and US sanctions and declaration of a new Syrian Government and constitution.
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