UK defence in 2025: Renewed interest in the Arctic

There has been a renewed interest in Arctic security as the region moves from being one of “high north, low tension” to an area of increasing geopolitical competition. That shift has been driven by the effects of climate change (such as melting ice and rising sea levels) which has the potential to open up new trade routes and economic opportunities, including increasing access to natural resources such as rare earth minerals.

Who are the Arctic states?

There are eight countries with territory within the Arctic Circle: Russia, the United States, Denmark (Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland. These countries form the Arctic Council. All the Arctic states, except for Russia, are members of NATO.

The Arctic Ocean is governed according to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Some maritime boundaries and the delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf are yet to be resolved.

Cooperation to competition

Since the end of the Cold War, the Arctic states have broadly cooperated on issues such as sustainable development, the environment and scientific research, and have maintained a shared commitment to avoid conflict.

However, cooperation is increasingly under threat as the region takes on greater geopolitical significance, particularly for the major global powers, Russia, China and the United States.

Russian priorities in the Arctic

The Russian Arctic accounts for over a quarter of Russian territory, while its Arctic coastline is over 24,000 km (approximately 53% of the total Arctic Ocean coastline).

Russian foreign policy and military doctrine identifies protecting Russia’s national interests in the Arctic as one of its biggest priorities. These interests include:

• unimpeded access to the high seas, specifically the Atlantic Ocean
• ability to access and protect its natural resources
• freedom of manoeuvre for Russia’s Northern Fleet, including the majority of Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent which is based on the Kola Peninsula.

Russia has also expressed an interest in developing the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as a competitive trade route. In its Arctic Strategy to 2035, Russia describes the delineation of its extended continental shelf (which would give it rights over an extended territory) as “fundamental to national economic security”.

Russia has been expanding its military presence in the Arctic for the last two decades, upgrading its military facilities, reconstituting Cold War military bases in the region, and strengthening its Northern Fleet.

There is significant debate, however, over Russia’s intentions in the Arctic and whether it is seeking to militarise the region or merely ensure the defence of its northern borders and territorial waters. Many Western governments, including the UK, have identified Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic as one of the main threats in the region.

A focus for the United States

Approximately 15% of the Arctic is US territory (Alaska). In 2022, the Biden administration released a National Strategy for the Arctic Region (PDF) which said that the goal of the US was a region “that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative”. However, it also acknowledged increasing competition among Arctic nations and said the US aimed to “both effectively compete and manage tensions”.

To date, the Trump administration has not released a new Arctic strategy. However, President Trump has made clear that the Arctic is a geopolitical priority in his second term. He has given much higher priority to his proposed policy of Greenland becoming part of the US and has not ruled out taking the territory by military force. On his first day in office at the start of his second term, President Trump also signed an executive order “aimed at boosting oil and gas drilling, mining and logging in Alaska”.

In recent years, questions have been raised in Congress as to whether the US military and the Coast Guard are sufficiently defending US interests in the region (PDF).

China – a self-defined ‘near Arctic state’

China has been building its presence in the Arctic over the last three decades and in 2018 declared itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’.

Access to resources and the opening up of future maritime trade routes are China’s two primary strategic interests in the region. China’s Polar Silk Road initiative specifically seeks to develop shipping lanes through the Arctic, focused initially on the Northern Sea Route (NSR). China’s cooperation with Russia is central to its Arctic ambitions.

NATO in the High North

NATO says that defence of the ‘High North’ is a strategic imperative for the alliance. The addition of Finland and Sweden to the alliance (in 2023 and 2024 respectively) is widely considered to have strengthened NATO’s geopolitical position in the High North.

Relevance of the Arctic to UK national security interests

The UK is not an Arctic state but considers itself “the nearest neighbour to the Arctic region”. As such, it retains considerable interest in the region.

The Integrated Review refresh in 2023 said “developments [in the High North] have direct consequences” for the Euro-Atlantic and the UK’s place within it. The UK’s long-term goal is for the region to “return to being a region of high cooperation and low tension”.

The security of the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap (GIUK) is of particular strategic importance to the UK.

UK military capabilities

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) does not maintain capabilities or units specifically dedicated to the defence of the High North. However, assets across all three services can be utilised to project force in the High North, as required.

The UK also engages with allies in NATO, the Joint Expeditionary Force, the Northern Group and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable to share situational awareness and align activity in the region.

In its 2023 report on UK strategy towards the Arctic (PDF), the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee voiced concern about the lack of “dedicated capabilities for Arctic operations” and said there are “long-standing concerns that the UK has insufficient resources to meet aspirations for a meaningful security presence in the High North and elsewhere”.

The forthcoming Strategic Defence Review

The Labour government commissioned a strategic defence review (SDR) shortly after taking office in July 2024. The terms of reference for the review do not explicitly mention the High North but will examine options to “reinforce homeland security”. The review is expected to report in spring 2025.

When asked in April 2025 whether the MOD had plans to permanently station UK forces in the High North, the government said that “The Strategic Defence Review will set the strategic direction for Defence for the next decade” and that the UK was “committed to maintaining a coherent Defence posture in the region and will defend and support our Allies should the need arise”.