In July 2024, Dr Masoud Pezeshkian is due to take office as Iran’s next president.
His election follows the death of President Ebrahim Raisi in May.
Describing himself as a “reformist-principalist”, Dr Pezeshkian is loyal to Iran’s Supreme Leader and the principles of the revolution which established the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.
He has sometimes been a critic, however. During the election, he criticised the use of force to apply the hijab dress code against women.
Dr Pezeshkian has also said he wants to work with the United States to lift its sanctions on Iran, in order to revitalize Iran’s struggling economy, and is open to returning to the 2015 nuclear deal.
This insight looks at the election result and examines what effect Masoud Pezeshkian could have on the Iran nuclear deal and Iranian foreign policy.
Pezeshkian was backed by some reformists
Iran’s Guardian Council, which approves presidential candidates, selected five from various conservative camps, as well as Masoud Pezeshkian, who received the backing of some reformist coalitions and politicians.
According to state data, June’s first round had the lowest turnout for an Iranian presidential election since 1979, at 40%. The US considers the election neither free nor fair.
As no candidate won more than 50% of the vote, a run-off was held in July between the top two candidates: Dr Pezeshkian and Saeed Jalili, a former diplomat who was highly critical of the 2015 nuclear deal.
In the final round, Dr Pezeshkian won 53% of the 30 million votes cast, with turnout rising to 50%.
On domestic policy, Pezeshkian will work with an Iranian parliament dominated by conservative and hardline factions following elections in March 2024. Parliamentarians were also elected on a record low turnout for parliamentary elections in Iran, at 41%.
On foreign policy the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, holds the most influence, rather than the president or parliament.
The Supreme Leader is currently 85. During his presidency, Dr Pezeshkian may have to oversee what may be a contested transition to a new Supreme Leader. Before his death, President Raisi had been considered a favoured candidate.
China and Russia’s engagement with Iran
Under former President Raisi, Iran pursued a policy of closer alignment with Russia and China.
China is now the largest purchaser of sanctioned Iranian oil, while Iran has provided Russia with drones for use in Ukraine, attracting new US, European Union and UK sanctions.
Dr Pezeshkian says he “values the friendship” of Russia and China.
However, as analysis by the Middle East Institute think-tank notes, China and Russia are unable to compensate for the economic effects of US sanctions. The European Council on Foreign Relations argues this creates leverage for Europeans over Iran, if Iran is willing to curtail its backing for Russia.
Chatham House think-tank argues Iran is unlikely to reduce its ties with Russia soon, but some movement away may be possible in the medium term (and is a likely prerequisite for the lessening of sanctions).
Iran’s actions abroad
Since the creation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has supported armed and terrorist groups across the Middle East, including through the 200,000-strong Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
UK and US intelligence also warn of Iranian threats to dissidents based in the UK, journalists and other individuals based in Europe and North America.
Pezeshkian has publicly praised the IRGC and backed Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas, two groups designated as terrorist organisations in the UK.
While both he and the Supreme Leader want to advance ties with Arab Gulf states, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates consider Iran a destabilising regional actor. There has been little improvement in Saudi-Iranian relations since ties were restored in 2023.
Iran’s nuclear programme
Since the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA – the Iran nuclear deal) and reimposed sanctions in 2018, Iran has increasingly violated the terms of the agreement.
Iran has breached limits on its stockpile of enriched uranium, possessing 30 times the JCPOA limit, and began enriching uranium to 60%, significantly in excess of the 3.67% agreed in the JCPOA. Weapons-grade uranium is enriched to 90%.
Some analysts judge that Iran can now develop enough fissile material for nuclear weapons almost immediately, if it wanted, though producing a deliverable warhead would take one to two years.
Iran maintains it has no desire to develop nuclear weapons. The 2024 US intelligence assessment judged that Iran is not undertaking such activities, but is in a “better position” to do so, if it wanted.
Could Pezeshkian’s election affect nuclear talks?
Dr Pezeshkian has said he considers sanctions a “serious detriment” and supports implementation of the JCPOA.
Despite former President Raisi’s hardline position, from 2023 he had overseen indirect talks with the United States on de-escalation in the Middle East and Iran’s nuclear programme.
Analysis for the policy institute the Center for Strategic Studies argues Pezeshkian’s election provides an opportunity for engagement that should not be rejected, even though expectations should be “limited”.
This is because ultimately Ali Khamenei will determine whether Iran reengages with the JCPOA. In 2023 the Supreme Leader had said there was “nothing wrong” with a nuclear deal.
Following Pezeshkian’s election, US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said the US had “no expectations” there would be a change in Iran.
He said Iran’s actions in the Middle East since 7 October 2023 meant the nuclear issue was “far from any meaningful diplomatic resolution right now”.
It remains the US view, shared by the European Union leaders and the United Kingdom Government, that diplomacy remains the “most effective way” to address Iran’s nuclear programme.
Further reading
- Royal United Services Institute, The limited options for managing the Iranian nuclear question, 3 July 2024
- Chatham House, Iran under Masoud Pezeshkian: Aiming for change without rocking the boat, 8 July 2024
- Italian Institute for International Political Studies, Will Iran’s Pezeshkian reboot dialogue with the West?, 11 July 2024
Author: Philip Loft is a Commons Library researcher, specialising in international affairs
Photo by Alexeiy on Adobe Stock